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The United States Navy Foreign Area Officer (FAO) program has been in the 
developmental stage since its inception in 2006, and should be examined to find ways to 
improve it and create efficiency in the four areas of utilization, training, promotion, and 
accessions. Many senior officers and government executives can provide valuable insight 
on areas for improvement and growth. This thesis was designed to collect those lessons 
learned and consolidate them to see where common threads may apply. Gathering this 
knowledge at the corporate, operational, and strategic level will lead to increased 
capabilities and efficiencies in the FAO program. 
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In 2005, a Deputy Secretary of Defense’s directive (see Appendix A) called for all 
Department of Defense (DoD) military services to establish cadres of officers to become 
a community of foreign area experts. These Foreign Area Officers (FAOs) would have a 
region-specific graduate degree and demonstrate language proficiency. The directive 
states that FAOs shall be 
commissioned officers with a broad range of military skills and 
experiences; have knowledge of political-military affairs; have familiarity 
with the political, cultural, sociological, economic, and geographic factors 
of the countries and regions in which they are stationed; and have 
professional proficiency in one or more of the dominant languages in their 
regions of expertise. (Department of Defense [DoD], 2005, p. 2) 
 In May 2006, in response to the DoD directive, the Chief of Naval Operations 
(CNO) issued an instruction (see Appendix B) to produce a cadre of officers with the 
skills required to manage and analyze politico-military activities overseas, specific to the 
United States Navy (USN). These specialists would serve on Fleet staffs, as defense and 
naval attaches, security assistance officers (SAOs), foreign war college students, and 
Personnel Exchange Program (PEP) officers (CNO, 2006). 
The Navy’s policy states that line and staff officers with at least eight years of 
commissioned service are eligible. The applicant must take the Defense Language 
Aptitude Battery (DLAB), which tests an individual’s ability to learn a language, and 
attain a minimum score of 95. Potential FAOs must also be suitable for overseas 
assignments and able to obtain a Top Secret/Sensitive Compartmented Information 
(TS/SCI) security clearance. 
Officers were to be selected semiannually, based on language proficiency or 
aptitude, education, performance, and experience. This corps of officers would be 
selected from a parent community in a lateral transfer or redesignation board. The 
minimum years of commissioned service requirement will give the officer sufficient 
knowledge and experience in their respective warfare areas. This minimum time 
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requirement allows the potential FAO to gain operational experience as well as grow into 
a seasoned junior officer. 
By February 2007, the Navy, with help from the Center for Naval Analysis 
(CNA), identified 268 unrestricted line (URL) billets that would be suitable for 
conversion to the new restricted line (RL) community of FAO. This approach established 
the definition of FAO and FAO positions, collected data to identify the community 
demands, and then analyzed these demands against the assessment criteria set by the 
DoD’s directives. (Lawlor & Roth, 2007). Those selected for the FAO community would 
receive a fully funded graduate education focused on a specific region of study. Upon 
completion of those graduate studies, the officer would then be assigned to the Defense 
Language Institute (DLI) for six to fifteen months, for language training based on their 
language. This training would be followed by in-country immersion, with the goal of 
obtaining foreign language skills at the professional level 3/3/3 in accordance with 
Department of Defense Instruction (DODI) 1315.17. This process was the initial shaping 
of the community that exists as of 2012. The preceding training structure is known as the 
initial career path for promotional year groups (PYG) 2012 and senior. The revised career 
path, or the “Interim Career Path” as per the 2012 FAO community brief (see Appendix 
C), is designed for PYGs 2013–2018. The Interim Career Path differs from the initial one 
due to the duration of the FAO training module, as well as longer tours in FAO billets. 
They will now be more consecutive. The community plans another adjustment to the 
career path for future FAOs in PYG 19 and junior. 
As of December 2012, the FAO community plans to reach an end-strength of 300 
officers by 2015. As per the DoD’s Sustaining Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st 
Century Defense, the present objectives may shape the climate of the community, as they 
will have global presence emphasizing the Asia-Pacific and the Middle East, while still 
ensuring our ability to maintain our defense commitments to Europe, and strengthening 
alliances and partnerships across all regions (DoD, 2012). 
B. PURPOSE 
The purpose of this study is to examine the FAO community in the areas of 
accession, training, and utilization and promotion. This study will look at where potential 
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improvements can be made within these areas, based on key stakeholder perspectives and 
surveys. Still in its relative infancy, the community has only grown to approximately 285 
officers. After six years of the Navy’s FAO existence, these senior officers (O-5 and 
above) and political-military executives have identified gaps within the community, as 
well as lessons learned. 
By gathering expert testimony, and analyzing common threads and trends, 
recommendations can be made and organized. This gathered knowledge will be used to 
fortify the Navy’s corps of foreign specialists. The findings of this thesis will be 
important to formulating the necessary changes in current and future FAO accession, 
training pipelines, utilization, and promotion. 
C. THESIS ORGANIZATION 
This thesis is organized into five chapters. Chapter II provides an extensive 
literature review that focuses on the current status of FAOs in the United States Navy, as 
well as their structure and status in comparison with the United States Army, Air Force, 
and Marine Corps. Additionally, this section provides support for the importance of this 
designation and focuses on the positive effect FAOs have on the armed services.  
Chapter III, Methodology, provides a detailed description of how this thesis was 
conducted. This section includes a description of the interviews and qualitative data 
analysis. Chapter IV provides research results, and will discuss senior officer and 
executive-level analysis, as well as active duty FAO survey results. Chapter V will offer 
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
The following literature review will provide information about all DoD FAO 
programs. This is intended to show differences and similarities between the Navy FAO 
program and those of the other services. 
A. THE UNITED STATES ARMY FOREIGN AREA OFFICER (FAO) 
PROGRAM 
According to Department of the Army Pamphlet 600-3, Commissioned Officer 
Professional Development and Career Management, U.S. Army FAOs advise senior 
military and civilian leaders as political-military officers. They are often the sole Army 
and/or DoD liaison in host countries, engaging in relationships with foreign military 
leaders and government officials (Department of the Army [DOA], 2010). 
1. Accessions 
The Army bases its selection criteria on seven elements that are mostly similar to 
the Navy criteria. However, the first differs from the Navy in that applicants need only 
seven years of commissioned service (YCS) vice eight to apply. This requirement also 
declares that the officer selected must complete a successful company-grade leader 
development course, have obtain basic branch experience, and not have greater than  
17 YCS. 
The minimum aptitude for learning foreign languages must be an acceptable 
DLAB score of 95 or better. More difficult Category IV (CAT IV) languages, however, 
require a score of 110 or better, with the highest possible score being 176. Those 
applicants already possessing language skills must attain a minimum of 2/2 on the 
Defense Language Proficiency Test (DLPT) in order to be designated as a FAO without 
formal language training (DOA, 2010). 
2. Training 
The Army divides its FAO qualification and training into three phases: 
institutional training, operational assignments, and self-development. The Army FAO 
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career begins with a five-tiered training course. The first tier begins with the FAO 
Orientation Course (FAOOC). Institutional Language training follows the FAOOC 
course, and is immediately supplemented by in-country training (ICT). Army FAOs 
receive continuous training via Advanced Civilian Schooling (ACS) such as the  
John F. Kennedy School of Government and Intermediate-Level Education (ILE) that 
focuses on common core Army warfighting. Officers that do not adequately complete one 
of these training elements will be returned to their basic branch or redesignated to  
another specialty. 
The FAOOC is a mandatory one-week program, usually administered at the 
Defense Language Institute Foreign Language Center (DLIFLC). Lessons discussed 
include family issues, FAO responsibilities, development, joint military environment, 
FAO life cycle, and an introduction to their respective regions of expertise. FAOs gain 
access to personal training plans, community managers, and other FAOs of different 
regional knowledge. 
Basic language training for FAOs is provided in at least one of the predominant 
languages in their respective regions. The Army FAO community manager called the 
FAO Proponent will designate the follow-on, ICT, based on the capacity of the officer 
and the current needs of the Army. Language training is conducted at the DLIFLC or DLI 
Washington and can range from 26 weeks to 63 weeks, depending on the difficulty of the 
language. It is a requirement for the officer to achieve minimum language proficiency by 
the end of the entry level of the program to continue in the targeted language ICT course 
(DOA, 2010). 
The ICT is designed for immersion of language and culture. This is usually 
executed by the officer attending a host nation professional military education course, or 
assignment to a host nation unit. Officers who attend foreign professional military 
schools are recognized for completing an Army Security Cooperation mission, a career 
milestone, and develop long-lasting professional relationships. FAOs are expected to 
familiarize themselves with, engage in, and research host-nation politics, geography, and 
social and economic conditions of their assigned region (DOA, 2010). 
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ACS is an opportunity available for FAOs with proven potential for sustained 
service. The officer will attend an approved university in an approved curriculum denoted 
as such by the FAO Proponent. Application to civilian graduate school must, at 
minimum, include one tax-supported school, which is generally low cost (<$13,000 
Fiscal Year [FY] 2008). FAOs that already have a graduate degree in a relevant area may 
apply for constructive credit from the FAO Proponent Office and will not be allowed to 
attend further schooling at the Army’s expense (DOA, 2010). 
ILE includes a 10-month Advanced Operations and Warfighting Course (AOWC) 
or the Western Hemisphere Institute for Security Cooperation (WHINSEC) especially for 
Latin America FAOs. The ILE will be completed after language training, ICT, and ACS. 
These courses are designed to reacclimatize the officer to Army operations after FAO 
training is complete, in preparation for potential assignment to an Army Service 
Component Command, Corps Headquarters, or the Army Staff at the Pentagon (DOA, 
2010). 
3. Utilization 
The following information about the utilization of Army FAOs is taken from the 
Department of the Army’s Pamphlet 600-3, Commissioned Officer Professional 
Development and Career Management, Chapter 28: 
FAO majors and lieutenant colonels focus mainly on their technical competencies 
through breadth and depth of FAO assignments. These skills are refined as the 
officer moves into the senior leader level at the rank of colonel. Sequencing of the 
type and location of assignments is not critical. The FAOs should avoid 
‘homesteading,’ and alternate between overseas and continental United States 
(CONUS) tours as much as possible. Confining oneself to any one type of work 
or in any one location typically reduces an officer’s utility as a FAO. Therefore, 
FAOs should ideally complete at least one assignment from three of the following 
five categories before promotion to colonel: 
(1) Overseas U.S. country team. Assignments include Defense attaché, 
Army attaché, assistant Army attaché, and security cooperation positions in a 
Security Assistance Office, Office of Defense Cooperation, or military group. 
(2) Army operational. Assignments include positions at the ASCC, Corps 
HQs, and Army Staff. 
(3) Political-Military. Assignments include Office of the Secretary of 
Defense (OSD) Staff, Joint Staff, National Security Council, Department of State, 
Defense Threat Reduction Agency, Defense Intelligence Agency, and combatant 
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commands. 
(4) Broadening. Generalist positions outside of functional area (FA) 48 
may be available as a means of broadening and developing multifunctional FA 48 
officers with operational relevance. Broadening assignments develop a wider 
range of knowledge and skills, augment understanding of the full spectrum of 
Army missions, promote practical application of leadership skills and permit 
FAOs to gain relevancy in areas outside of their Area of Concern (AOC). 
Broadening assignments may include Military Transition Teams (MiTTs) and 
Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs). 
(5) Institutional. Assignments include AHRC, Defense Language Institute, 
United States Military Academy (USMA), Training and Doctrine Command 
(TRADOC), Fort Leavenworth, Carlisle Barracks, and the WHINSEC (DOA, 
2010, pp. 259–260). 
B. THE UNITED STATES AIR FORCE INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS 
SPECIALIST PROGRAM 
The following information is taken from Air Force Instruction 16–109, 
International Affairs Specialist (IAS) Program, which has reconfigured the Air Force 
FAO community into a new program divided into two parts. This program complies with 
the requirements of Department of Defense Instruction 1315.20, but divides the previous 
FAO career into two separate occupations known as Political Affairs Specialists (PASs) 
and Regional Affairs Specialists (RASs). 
1. ACCESSIONS 
Under the IAS program, the Air Force Development Teams (DTs) will be 
established to filter and select officers for the IAS career path, usually around the 
midcareer level between 7 and 12 years of service. This timeline allows the IAS officer to 
become fully qualified in a primary Air Force specialty, allowing the IAS officer to gain 
sufficient operational knowledge. This experience and knowledge gained prepares them 
to become a legitimate advocate of the Air Force. Those officers wishing to join the IAS 
community indicate such on their Air Force Development Plan (ADP). 
PAS officers are typically selected with 10–12 YCS, in concurrence with 
Intermediate Developmental Education (IDE). RAS officers who are selected are 
relatively junior compared to PASs, with between 7 and 10 YCS. This allows more time 
for language training, which is the fundamental difference between the two IAS careers. 
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RAS officers must meet minimum DLAB requirements to apply as well as maintain a 
minimum DLPT proficiency of 2/2. The applicant must also be deployable and agree to 
volunteer for worldwide assignment. 
2. TRAINING 
Selectees for the IAS program will receive formal graduate education and 
training. PAS programs may include the Naval Postgraduate School (NPS), foreign IDE 
programs (English-speaking), and Air Command and Staff College (ACSC). PAS 
trainees will also complete a political-military (POL-MIL) IDE program prior  
to qualification. 
 RAS officers complete a more lengthy and rigorous training and education 
program, starting with region-specific graduate education. The officer will then become 
proficient in a language within their academic expertise via DLI. This training will be 
supplemented by a minimum of six months of ICT within said region. Those who do not 
already hold a region-specific graduate degree will complete an advanced academic 
degree through NPS, Olmstead scholarship, or International Senior Development 
Education (I/SDE) (Secretary of the Air Force [SAF], 2010). 
At NPS, the student will attend the Department of National Security Affairs 
(NSA), focusing on international policy and relations. Olmstead Scholars, who are 
nominated by the Air Force and selected by the Olmstead board of directors, will receive 
an advanced education at a foreign university. By sending RAS officers to I/SDE 
programs, the Air Force enhances the knowledge, culture, and foreign language 
proficiency of the student, as well as enabling them to create professional foreign 
contacts within the region. 
To maintain language proficiency, the Air Force administers enhancement 
programs via the Language and Area Studies Immersion (LASI) program, online 
language training, and/or individual tutoring programs. These programs vary in length 
from the one-month LASI training to the 12-month online language program. 
Along with continuing language proficiency, RAS officers maintain current 
regional knowledge through the Regional Studies Enhancement Program. This program 
allows officers to stay current on POL-MIL, economic, and social-cultural issues in their 
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respective areas. This training may be conducted through the Foreign Service Institute, 
Regional Security Studies Centers, or the Air Force Special Operations School (SAF, 
2010). 
3. UTILIZATION 
Opportunities for PAS officers may be determined by their core career field, but it 
also depends on availability. Most, however, will serve in an international POL-MIL 
affairs assignment after IDE. 
RAS officers have a unique career progression, based on a dual career path. These 
officers will alternate between their primary specialty and RAS assignments. When 
possible, an RAS officer’s primary specialty will complement their regional area  
of expertise. 
Lieutenant Colonel Thad Hunkins, an Air Force RAS Colonel, describes the 
utilization of Air Force PASs and RASs: 
The PAS track is designed for a ‘one-time’ assignment after receiving in 
residence developmental education whereas the RAS has a more broad 
and enduring set of skills most closely identified with the traditional Army 
FAO. After they’ve received the requisite education and training, RAS 
personnel will alternate between RAS-coded assignments and their core 
specialty. There are over 320 RAS positions in the USAF, 80% of which 
are overseas and 75% that are considered ‘joint’ duty. Majors and Lt Cols 
can expect to hold assignments at U.S. embassies as Assistant Attache 
Officers and Security Assistance Officers. Additionally, they may serve on 
any Air Force Major Command Pol-Mil staff, as an Intel analyst, or as 
desk officers covering their specific area of expertise. As Colonels, the 
vast majority will become Defense Intelligence Agency assets primarily 
executing either Air or Defense Attache duties at U.S. embassies. 
Additionally, they can serve as Security Assistance Office chiefs, Office 
of the Secretary of Defense staff officers, Joint Force Air Component 
Commander advisors, or generically as Political Advisors to MAJCOM 
and COCOM commanders. (2009, p. 8) 
C. THE UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS 
OFFICER PROGRAM 
Similar to the Air Force, the Marine Corps FAO program was re-shaped into an 
International Affairs Officer Program (IAOP). The previous FAO Military Occupational 
Specialty (MOS) was divided into two subcategories known as the FAO and the Regional 
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Affairs Officer (RAO). Marine Corps Order 1520.11E specifies the training and 
eligibility for RAOs and FAOs, and has not been updated since December 2000. The 
RAO is basically a FAO without language skills. The purpose of the RAO track is to 
“augment the FAO program by increasing the pool of Marine Corps linguists and 
regional specialists at lower fiscal and personal costs” (DON, 2000, p. 10). 
These officers will generally follow the dual-track assignment design. Similar to 
the Air Force design, the IAO will alternate between their Primary MOS (PMOS) and 
Alternate MOS (AMOS). 
1. ACCESSIONS 
Under the IAOP, there is a distinction between FAO and RAO eligibility. The 
main difference between the two is that the FAO will be required to speak a foreign 
language. Accession is also divided into an “experience track” or “study track.” These 
two training tracks look at what the officer already possesses in terms of education  
and experience. 
For the FAO, the experience track allows the officer to utilize the tools already 
gained via degree completion, significant regional experience, final security clearances 
held, and demonstrated language capability. This allows the experienced officer to omit 
attending some or most of the training requirements. 
As for the experienced RAO, he or she must already have a graduate degree in 
international relations or a region-specific political science concentration. The rank 
eligibility for the two experienced tracks is from second lieutenant to general officer, 
giving a broad range for potential billet fills. 
The study track is obviously more time consuming and costly. The grade 
eligibility for this program is more junior for FAOs (first lieutenant through major), than 
RAOs (major through colonel). 
Enclosure (1) of the Marine Corps Order [MCO] 1520.11E declares: 
Those who are designated as FAOs constitute a nucleus of Marine Corps regional, 
cultural, and linguistic specialists. They will be assigned an additional MOS of 
994x, Foreign Area Officer (by region/language), as follows: 
(1) 9940 - Basic FAO, FAO-in-training, or FAO without current DLPT 
(w/in 5 years) ** 
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(2) 9941 - Latin America: Spanish/Portuguese/Haitian Creole 
(3) 9942 - Former Soviet Union (FSU): 
Russian/Belorussian/Ukrainian/Latvian Georgian 
(4) 9943 - People’s Republic of China (PRC): Chinese (Mandarin, 
Cantonese, etc.) 
(5) 9944 - Middle East/North Africa: Arabic/Hebrew 
(6) 9945 - Sub-Saharan Africa: Swahili/French/Portuguese 
(7) 9946 - Southwest Asia: Farsi/Afghan/Pushtu/Urdu/Hindi/Bengali 
(8) 9947 - Western Europe: Spanish/French/German/Greek/ Turkish 
(9) 9948 - East Asia (excluding PRC): Japanese/ Korean/Thai/Vietnamese/ 
Khemer/Lao/Malay/Tagalog/Indonesian 
(10) 9949 - Eastern Europe (excluding FSU): 
Czech/Polish/Bulgarian/Magyar/Romanian/ Serbo-Croatian 
* Other appropriate languages may apply to each region. 
** In order to rate Foreign Language Proficiency Pay (FLPP), a FAO must 
retest annually on the DLPT; after 5 years without retesting on the 
appropriate DLPT, a FAO’s regional AMOS will be downgraded to 9940 
(DON, 2000, p. 13). 
As the Marine Corps RAO is dual track, the officer will essentially have two 
occupations. Enclosure (2) of the MCO 1520.11E explains how the officer is granted an 
additional MOS that identifies their area of expertise: 
The RAO geographical divisions of specialization correspond exactly to those of 
the FAO program. Regional Affairs Officers will be assigned an additional MOS 
of 982x (by region) as follows: 
(1) 9821 - Latin America 
(2) 9822 - Former Soviet Union (FSU) 
(3) 9823 - People’s Republic of China 
(4) 9824 - Middle East/North Africa 
(5) 9825 - Sub-Saharan Africa 
(6) 9826 - Southwest Asia (SWA) 
(7) 9827 - Western Europe 
(8) 9828 - East Asia (excluding PRC) 
(9) 9829 - Eastern Europe (excluding the former USSR)  
(DON, 2000, p. 10) 
2. TRAINING 
During the Marine Corps FAO study track, training is divided into three main 
regions: the Middle East, Eastern Europe, and Asia. These general areas include a large 
portion of surrounding countries as well as the languages spoken within these regions. 
Academic training begins at NPS and is followed by up to 63 weeks of language training 
at DLIFLC. Phase II of language training allows the officer one year in country, studying 
at a specific learning center such as the Foreign Service Institute in Japan, or the George 
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C. Marshall European Center for Strategic Studies in Germany. These assignments often 
allow the FAO’s spouse educational opportunities as well, for easier family transition. 
The FAO and RAO study track qualifications are essentially the same with the 
exception of the FAO studying a foreign language. If an RAO serves within a Defense 
Attaché Office (DAO) or Security Assistance Office (SAO), the supported agency will 
provide language training and the RAO will ultimately receive the FAO AMOS. 
The RAO study track trains the officer in a specific region through the NSA 
program at NPS. This curriculum involves an 18-month program and requires the 
completion of a thesis. Since the RAO track does not involve language training, ICT is 
not required. The RAO training path is comparatively faster than the typical FAO  
three-year course. 
3. UTILIZATION 
There are approximately 236 POL-MIL billets to which an IAO can be assigned. 
Of course, many factors are involved in the officer’s placement, including the status of 
their primary MOS, their region specialty, their rank, and vacancies. Those officers who 
have received funded graduate education will serve one validated IAO billet as soon as 
possible after completion of their graduate education, or in the FAO track, after 
completion of the ICT. 
IAO utilization tours will be separated by a minimum of three years, whenever 
possible, to allow the officer to stay competitive for promotion in their primary MOS 
where they are promotable. In the experience track, no DoD funding is expended for 
training; therefore, the experience-track IAO will not incur a direct service obligation or 
“pay-back” tour. These officers are encouraged to apply for billets that involve their 
linguistic or regional expertise (DON, 2000). 
Immediately upon qualification, billets for IAOs will generally be assigned to 
staff or operational tours depending on the specific region, as well as attaché assignments 
through the DAO. Those who attended the study-track will incur a five-year obligation 
for FAO and a three-year obligation for RAO. 
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D. A COMPARISON OF THE UNITED STATES NAVY FOREIGN AREA 
OFFICER (FAO) PROGRAM TO ALL MILITARY SERVICES 
The DoD prepares an annual report of all military services for FAO programs. It 
provides an FY summary of data and component reviews. The report is sent to all 
military services headquarters, Joint Staff, and all directors of the defense agencies. The 
report takes displays the status of all military services’ FAO community. The purpose of 
presenting these results is to compare how the Navy stacks up to the other military 
services. 
1. Hitting the Target 
At the end of FY11, all DoD services combined totaled over 2,000 designated 
FAOs. While the community is increasing as a whole, the billet fill rate has not reached 
the desired 95%. Much of the demand and billet increase has been from Combatant 
Commands (COCOMs). These commanders depend on security cooperation and regional 
expertise that FAOs provide, and show concern that vacancies in the area specialist billets 
have increased for three consecutive years. OASD stated, “This forces the commands to 
place unqualified officers into essential overseas billets heavily degrading the 
implementation of U.S. policy” (OASD, 2012, p. 2). 
The CNO has directed a goal of 400 fully qualified FAOs by FY15. At the start of 
the USN FAO program, the initial CNA study found that there were 286 billets in the 
Navy that could be converted to FAOs. This number differed from the Chief of Naval 
Operations (OPNAV) structure that found 268 billets (Lawlor & Roth, 2007). By the end 
of FY11, 268 of these billets had been converted and designated as requiring a FAO fill. 
Even though the USN FAO community is the newest among the military services, 
it does not have plans to increase accessions for the next five years. Other military 
services may have a greater need for FAOs. However, the current end strength of the 
USN and USAF are comparatively the same, yet the Navy has the fewest current yearly 




Service FY12 FY13 FY14 FY15 FY16 FY17 TOTAL 
U.S. Army 79 79 79 79 79 87 482 
U.S. Navy 35 37 34 26 14 14 160 
U.S. Air Force 63 63 63 63 63 63 378 
U.S. Marine Corps 40 40 40 40 40 40 240 
Total 210 212 209 201 189 245 1,260 
Table 1.   FAO Projected Accessions (From OASD, 2012). 
 Additionally, the Navy has been receiving an efficient number of applications per 
accession. Only the Army is more efficient as this process, as both the Army and Navy 
have been seeing a steady decline in applications (see Figure 1). The outlier exists for the 
Marine Corps in FY 11 due to the Commandant’s policy to screen all eligible officers for 
graduate education and special programs. This screening process included the FAO 
program as one of the eight that was newly automatically eligible (OASD, 2012). 
 
 
Figure 1. Applicant Rate (Applications per Billet) by Service by Fiscal Year  












FY	  07	   FY	  08	   FY	  	  09	   FY	  10	   FY	  11	  
US	  Army	  
US	  Air	  Force	  
US	  Navy	  
US	  Marine	  Corps	  
 16 
2. Training Quality Officers 
The percentage of FAO training completion throughout the services measures 
DoD’s ability to process the required number of FAOs through the training pipeline. 
Language training at DLI can be extremely difficult and is the primary reason for 
attrition. In general, the language training goal for FAOs is to score a minimum of 2/2 in 
listening and reading on the DLPT. With the exception of the Army, all services hit 
nearly 100% in FY 11, indicating that the boards are selecting the most qualified and 
motivated officers (OASD, 2012). 
 One of the main reasons these selectees must be of high quality is due to the high 
training costs associated with the designation. As mentioned throughout the literature 
review, the FAO initial training pipeline can last up to three years. The Navy has not 
“bought in” to the system, compared to the other services. The Army, Air Force, and 
Marine Corps all invest more than twice as many dollars per person as much in their 
officers than does the Navy in terms of training (see Table 2). It must be noted that 
discrepancies exist with language training calculations for the USN and USMC due to the 
executive agent (Army) program and sunk costs (OASD, 2012). A major factor in this 
comparison for the Navy, however, is in-country training. Although stated to be $15,800, 
the OASD FY 11 FAO report claims that the program is virtually nonexistent at this time 
due to the fiscal environment. The following table is a breakdown of dollars invested per 
FAO in each military service. 
 
Description (per FAO) U.S. Army U.S. Air Force U.S. Navy U.S. Marine Corps 
Language Training Costs $131.0K $132.3K $43.2K $56.4K 
In-Country Training Costs $103.2K $48.0K $15.8K $99.0K 
Graduate Education Costs $25.2K $16.0K $21.0K $13.0K 
Table 2.   FAO Individual Training Costs (From OASD, 2012). 
3. Filling Billets with Value 
The DoD goal of filling 95% of FAO-coded billets with qualified officers has not 
been achieved. Although improving, the Navy still has not completely identified all  
POL-MIL or regional billets that should be entitled to the FAO-coded designation (1710). 
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A large demand for these billets has been coming from the COCOMs where security 
cooperation, peaceful communication, and regional knowledge will contribute to the 
geographical combatant command’s effectiveness. For example, United States Africa 
Command (USAFRICOM) will add 20 FAO billets to meet the increased need in 
Security Cooperation Offices (SCOs). It should be noted that the billet increase is not 
broken out by service. However, fill rates for these positions have decreased for the past 
three years and that has forced the commands to place unqualified officers into essential 
positions (OASD, 2012). 
The Navy has made significant improvement in filling FAO specific billets over 
the past few years (see Figure 2), staying consistent with the Army and Marine Corps at 
around the 80% mark. A major reason for the notable increase is due to a reduction in the 
number of FAOs in non-FAO-coded billets. The Air Force seems to have a greater 
difficulty with this issue due to the dual-track program, and their policy on filling billets 
with the “best-fit officer.” 
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 This chapter describes how the qualitative data was collected and analyzed in 
order to answer the research questions and objectives. It will discuss the process of 
question formulation, interviewee recruitment, organization, and analysis of results to 
make conclusions and recommendations. 
 Research interest was triggered by the CNO’s 2008 report titled U.S. Navy 
Language Skills, Regional Expertise, and Cultural Awareness (LREC), and the author 
wanted to investigate an area that was relatively new to the Navy and discover where 
changes can be made. This community relies on nontechnical expertise and is an area 
where the Navy is relatively inexperienced. 
 As mentioned in Chapter I, the Deputy Secretary of Defense issued a directive in 
2005 for all military services to establish programs to designate FAOs. The vision to 
improve the Navy’s global knowledge and awareness was also mentioned in the Navy 
Strategic Plan of 2007: 
Trust and cooperation cannot be surged. Expanded cooperative 
relationships will contribute to the security and stability of the maritime 
domain for the benefit of all . . . . A key to fostering such relationships is 
development of sufficient cultural, historical and linguistic expertise 
among our sailors . . . to nurture effective interaction with diverse 
international partners. (CNO, 2008, p. 6) 
 Since the inception of the Navy FAO program in 2006, there has been little 
published on the lessons learned and potential improvements within the community. This 
could be attributed to the community’s young stage of development. Gathering this 
information, however, will help to improve the Navy’s FAO program, while aiding the 
Navy Strategic Plan. The LREC Strategy outlines the following nine objectives that 
pertain to the importance of the FAO program: 
1.  Align and consolidate the organization, policies and processes 
associated with LREC under the management of the Navy’s Senior 
Language Authority (SLA) (CNO N13) to efficiently program, 
coordinate, and deliver the capability. 
2.  Ascertain the scope, depth and breadth of LREC capability and 
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capacity within the total force and implement processes to monitor 
readiness, measure proficiency, and align to Fleet requirements. 
3.  Accurately define the Navy’s LREC requirements and articulate 
specific competencies (i.e., translator, interpreter, Foreign Area 
Officer), degrees of expertise, and capacities needed by the force. 
4.  Identify LREC capability and capacity shortfalls in the force and 
develop a plan to fill the gaps, either by building capability or 
realigning existing capacity. 
5.  Expand cultural awareness in the force by integrating regional 
content and, as appropriate, language familiarization in Navy 
Professional Military Education (NPME), pre-/mid-deployment 
training, and port visit orientation. 
6.  Maximize the contributions of language professionals and 
language-enabled Sailors through increased training opportunities 
and appropriate incentives. 
7.  Build capability and capacity by implementing language-related 
accession and heritage-community recruiting goals, increasing 
undergraduate LREC study where appropriate, and directly 
training selected post-accession officers as appropriate. 
8.  Fully implement Navy’s FAO Program and optimize the Personnel 
Exchange Program (PEP) consistent with the expanding 
relationships with emerging partners. 
9.  Coordinate these objectives with the Defense Language Office, the 
Joint Staff, other Services, DoD Agencies, and the Combatant 
Commanders, as appropriate, to avoid duplication of effort and 
promote joint and combined operations. (CNO, 2008, p. 8–9) 
B. THE EXPERT SELECTION PROCESS 
 The objective of the research interview process was to consult military- and 
executive civilian-level positions that have experience and interaction as and/or with 
FAOs. The initial points of contact for these individuals started at NPS’s School of 
International Graduate Studies, and then reached out to personnel from Japan to Italy. 
Subjects were also recruited from the Joint Foreign Area Officer Orientation Course 
(JFAOOC), held twice annually at DLIFLC. This completed the first round of interviews 
and subsequently led to a second round of interviews via referrals. The officers 
interviewed were the rank of Commander or Captain. The executive level civilians that 
were interviewed worked in the Department of State (DOS) or the United Nations (UN) 
and had experience with the FAO community. There were a total of 13 subjects 
interviewed for this thesis. 
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C. THE INTERVIEW QUESTIONS 
 After completion of the literature review as well as advisor discussions, questions 
were created that would induce detailed discussions. All subjects were questioned in the 
most uniform way possible to allow for consistency. The subjects, however, often 
elaborated on the areas that they felt were most important. Questions were tailored for 
nonmilitary personnel with FAO experience such as those that worked at the  
UN and DOS. Initial interview questions can be found in Appendix D. 
D. THE ANALYSIS 
The goal of the qualitative data collection was to recognize common threads of 
information from their professional experience and to identify lessons learned. The 
information threads were then organized and used to create recommendations. There is 
reasonable cause to believe that from 2006 to the present, the Navy FAO program has 
grown and that valuable conclusions can be made from those who built the community. 
Therefore, the results and commonalities from this investigation are substantial. These 
common factors were organized into the categories of accession, training, utilization, and 
promotion. The strongest held opinions within each category are those where the 
interviewee elaborated, and they will be discussed in depth in Chapters IV and V. The 
interview results indeed provided many suggestions for further analytical study, 
especially in the areas of training and promotion. 
E. SUMMARY 
 Chapters I and II provided background on DoD’s FAO programs, used as a tool to 
help shape the newest defense FAO community—the Navy’s—and compare it to those in 
the other armed services. These two chapters established the foundation for the research, 
ultimately leading to subject selection, interview questions, and the analysis described in 
Chapter III. The results, analysis, and recommendations will be presented in chapters IV 
and V. 
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IV. RESULTS 
“Success in achieving our nation’s Maritime Strategy depends in a large part on 
the ability to communicate with and comprehend potential adversaries, enduring allies, 
and emerging partner nations” (CNO, 2008, p. 1). 
 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Throughout the research and interviews conducted it became evident that the 
Navy is behind the power curve in cultivating a force structure that does not involve the 
typical technical expert whom may work on a radar console or a gas turbine engine. The 
success of the FAO program will depend on leadership to make changes in the current 
Navy’s non-technical program business rules. As a consumer of FAOs in the 
international context, Interviewee U is a former naval officer that currently works for the 
UN office in the DOS and explains: 
I am doubtful that the Navy can really pull off a FAO program. I am going 
to come right out and say that because we are such a technical service. We 
are a technical service and if you are a line officer, your place is at sea. 
Navy has run like that for 200 years and it will run like that for the next 
200 years. (Interviewee U) 
The purpose of this thesis was to gain the expert knowledge of those stakeholders 
who have had significant experience with the FAO community. The literature review was 
written as a result of the initial interviews. These initial results collectively suggested that 
the Navy needs to examine their sister DoD services before it can question its own. 
 The Navy began as a surface warfare-dominant culture that eventually evolved 
into advanced aviation and submarine technology. The shift in focus from these core 
competencies to other areas of strategic importance has been slow, but, the subjects who 
were interviewed for this thesis clearly conveyed where change is needed. This chapter 
will express the subjects’ ideas for changes to the Navy’s FAO program. 
B. THE NAVY HAS NOT BOUGHT INTO THE FAO PROGRAM 
As mentioned in Chapter III, the Navy requires fewer accessions when compared 
to the other services in annual FAO quotas (see Table 1). The following interview and 
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research analysis will explain why it is in the Navy culture to overlook the warfare areas 
that are not directly technical. 
1. The Language, Regional Expertise and Cultural Awareness Approach 
In January 2008, two years after the FAO program’s inception, the CNO came out 
with a new LREC Strategy, which goes into much detail about the importance of 
awareness of changing cultural areas and how it will transcend the naval combat 
structure: 
The number and variety of cultures and foreign languages the Navy faces 
in this new environment far and away exceeds the level faced in the Cold 
War. Strategic, operational and tactical success will depend to some 
degree on practical skill in less commonly taught languages. It will also 
require an awareness of unfamiliar regional cultures, many of which were 
long suppressed by foreign domination, and some of which are resistant to 
the 21st Century global system. Navy LREC competencies will be 
indispensable to penetrating cultural barriers, and understanding 
unfamiliar, ambiguous, and seemingly irrational behaviors.  
(CNO, 2008, p. 4–5) 
 It was mentioned by nearly all of the FAO stakeholders interviewed, that this has 
not yet been a fully executed plan. Interviewee C is currently a Navy FAO Commander 
(CDR) with much experience in personnel and explains his thoughts on the Navy’s 
execution of the LREC Strategy: 
I do not believe that they have bought into LREC. I just think that it comes 
down to that yes, if you ask leaders within the Navy if LREC is important, 
they will tell you yes, but then when it comes to action regarding LREC; 
i.e., funding it fully or prioritizing it over other needed training, you will 
find that LREC is not a priority. So it is one of those, the stereotype could 
be that it is—it is not a priority because we do put our money where our 
mouth is. You know, usually the context of LREC, it comes very much 
like this; “Sir, do you believe that learning a language, having a deep, 
regional understanding and cultural awareness of the areas in which you 
are going to operate in are important?”  To a “T,” I would say that it 
would be unanimous; “Yes.” Okay, “so if you were to give up X amount 
of your funding for flight hours or for Aegis training, would you?” The 
answer is obviously “No.” (Interviewee M) 
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2. The Problem with Leadership Diversity 
One of the benefits of naval leadership, especially in the URL communities, is the 
opportunity for varied fleet occupations. This puts the typical URL officer in charge of 
naval programs/projects that would normally be atypical to him or her. An open-minded 
officer might be successful at this task by listening to the experts beneath them, and make 
logical decisions. However, this is not always the case. 
My best example was Admiral XXX. He planned policy and strategy for 
the Navy at a critical time. This is 1990—Cold War is clearly ending and 
we are about to come up with force structures and a strategy that is going 
to take us from the Cold War into the post-Cold War world. He was an 
attack pilot and you go into his office and he had a toggle stick from an A-
4 on his desk that was really kind of cool, but he was very proud in saying 
that he is an operator. By that—in the Navy context as an operator. His 
first POL-MIL job was as a three star admiral. Well bully for him, but 
what the Navy needed at that point—one of the reasons you are looking at 
a Navy with 285 ships right now is because of a practice that puts folks 
like him in charge of your force structure articulation. Somebody who had 
never been in Washington, didn’t know how this worked, had no POL-
MIL background was in charge of the whole shooting match. Again, so 
this isn’t just a FAO problem, it is a Navy problem. (Interviewee U) 
C. THE INITIAL ACCESSION AND TRAINING MODEL DOES NOT 
WORK 
The current FAO model of accessions and training creates problems within a FAO 
career timeline, especially with promotions. The time of accession (between 8 and 12 
years of commissioned service) for the officer often puts him or her in jeopardy for career 
promotion. This is mainly due to the length of the training model. 
1. The Effects of Timing on Accession and Promotion 
As mentioned in the literature review, a potential FAO officer is selected and is 
then put into the training pipeline. As the officer is in training and doesn’t have a metric 
for work-related performance other than training completion, there is a large gap in the 
time they are observed performing tasks in their occupations. This causes the FAO to 
receive multiple, nonobserved (NOB), fitness reports (FITREPs). As the comments in 
FITREPs are essential for promotion selection, long periods of nonobserved comments 
make it difficult for a promotion board to choose that officer. Interviewee N is a Navy 
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FAO Captain (CAPT) that as of 2012 works in the FAO education and training pipeline 
and commented on the effect of training duration on promotion. 
You know one thing it didn’t factor in was the effect of a long training 
[career] path on careers. Specifically, if you send somebody in [when that] 
initially assessed, you bring them into NPS, get them the 18 month with 
thesis option master’s—that is a year and a half [NOB] time, you are 
assigned to a region where it requires a Cat 4 language—Arabic, Chinese, 
Korean, Japanese, whatever—oh, even a one year Cat 3 language like 
[Cantonese] and so on, you are now out of the loop potentially for three 
years. So three years of [NOB] time, you are dead on arrival on 
promotion, for promotion purposes in many ways. (Interviewee N) 
With the current model, the Navy often seems to make trade-offs between the best 
FAO candidate based on merit and a sufficiently suitable candidate that will fit within the 
FAO training pipeline. If the officer is selected for the program, they may end up being 
NOB for quite some time, as mentioned. In this case, the officer does not bring much to 
the promotion table, and failure to promote to LCDR results in being separated from the 
Navy. The previous interviewee explains how poor timing can potentially be career 
ending as well as influence selection: 
Being promotable carries weight and we know you can make it because 
the worst thing for us to do is pick up a lieutenant and then he or she falls 
out because they didn’t have that deep operational experience and then in 
the middle of a long training track and then they go home. We have lost I 
think at least five since. (Interviewee N). 
2. The Equal Opportunity Struggle 
Another promotion problem facing FAOs is the promotion board composition. 
For example, if the FAO promotion board is comprised of seven members, only two of 
the voting members will be FAOs. This is due to the URL officers, who are mostly 
Surface Warfare Officers (SWOs) and aviators, being the majority stake owners in the 
promotion board. This happens because the source community, where the FAO came 
from, was a URL community. Furthermore, data gained from these interviews declared 
that if the two FAOs agree that a particular person is the one to promote based on his/her 
accomplishments as a FAO, and the URL officers disagree because of the candidate’s 
past tours as an URL officer, then that person will not get promoted. Figure 3 shows the 
parity in board selection rates for FY 11. Regrettably, there were zero selections to 
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Captain (O-6) versus 64% in-zone service selection. It should be noted that the FAO 




Figure 3. FAO Selection vs. Service Board Selection Rate for FY 11  
(From OASD, 2012). 
Interviewee D is a retired Navy Captain that initiated the FAO and POL-MIL 
subspecialty. He eventually helped create the RL community. He explains the frustration 
with the way promotion boards work: 
But you know somebody at the top is going to have to put their hand on 
the tiller and tell these boards that three tours at sea doesn’t count more 
than a guy who did two tours at sea plus a FAO tour. I mean that its just-
you know, the rule is ducks promote ducks. (Interviewee D) 
3. The Whole Person Look at Accession 
Since it has been established that the initial FAO career timeline is and/or will be 
unsuccessful in promotion, every interviewee agreed that selection and training must be 
tailored to the individual. This creates some bias compared to the original model because 
a top-notch performer may fail to select due to the lack of “bringing something to the 
table.” The applicant that already possesses a language and/or relevant master’s degree 
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therefore has the advantage that is not based on performance. Interviewee C is a FAO 
CDR with detailing and lateral transfer board experience. 
And we try to do our accessions very carefully. We look strongly at the 
lieutenants to see if they have done enough. If their FITREPS are strong 
enough, or maybe that lieutenant already has a master’s degree because 
some people go to the academy and they go right into a master’s program. 
(Interviewee C) 
D. FLEET EXPERIENCE IS NECESSARY 
Only two of the interviewees argued that as a RL community, it is unnecessary for 
a FAO to have a URL background. RL communities, such as public affairs, intelligence, 
and cryptology, do not require operational experience and can easily be compared to the 
FAO occupation. Therefore, justification for the FAO operational requirement should be 
examined. 
1. Establish Credibility 
The background of the FAO is predominately surface, subsurface, or aviation 
unrestricted line officers. This demonstrates that the officer has operational experience as 
well as a wide range of naval knowledge. This is the advantage that a FAO will have 
compared to the RL communities that allow direct accession without previous 
unrestricted line officer experience. A Navy FAO Captain explains why this operational 
experience is important: 
It is critical because that really is what is going to establish your 
credibility. The only thing we have in terms of credibility in terms of a 
FAO when we go downrange is the warfare device we wear on our chest. 
When I was operational people kept asking, “Why don’t you guys get your 
own pin?” I said, “Why? We are wearing our own pin right now. We are 
wearing our surface warfare pin, we are wearing our aviation pin.” When 
we go downrange, they don’t know what a FAO pin is but they know what 
a SWO pin is. (Interviewee N) 
 The previously mentioned retired Navy Captain agrees with Interviewee N when 
he says: 
They want some guy who has been somewhat successful as an operator in 
some operational community of the Navy and at least knows what is going 
on. So if you have these folks who were sort of like were commissioned 
from birth as FAOs, I don’t think that would be as powerful as having 
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somebody who had an operational career and then transited in. 
(Interviewee D) 
2. A Different Perspective to Operational Experience 
Although the majority agrees that a URL officer experience establishes 
professional credibility, some view that time spent as a lack of experience within the 
FAO community. They critique the eight to twelve years prior to becoming an FAO as 
eight to twelve years of forgone FAO community experience. Interviewee U comments 
on his experiences with Navy FAOs he says need more experience: 
I mean it kills me to say this, but the Army FAO program I found is 
actually the best. It hurts, it actually hurts for those words to come out. It 
just kills me to say this, but you know the Army FAOs seem to have been 
the best and I think it gets back to the accession question. I think the Army 
catches them younger… you have got to catch them younger. That is how 
we fix this skill/rank mismatch. We have got to give them the experience. 
They have got to get stick time. They have got to get stick time in junior 
ranks so we need to take a look at that. (Interviewee U) 
 A newly trained Navy FAO agrees with Interviewee U as he explained how he as 
an aviator, was most familiar with aviation platforms, and how his warfare device did not 
privy him to the experience and knowledge of subsurface and surface operations. He 
compared the lack of experience in those areas as justification to select junior officers to 
get actual FAO operational experience in instead of the 8 to 12 YCS required  
to apply. 
E. THERE IS A GREATER NEED FOR FAO BILLETS THAN PERCEIVED 
With the current inventory of approximately 288 FAO coded billets in Navy and 
Joint commands, it is the consensus of senior FAOs interviewed that this number is far 
less than the billets actually needed in the community. The program, being relatively 
new, has shown steady growth; however, planned accession shows decline. The return on 
investment for the FAO is seemingly high. They incur initial training costs, sometimes 
none at all, and offer valuable regional expertise as a single entity. At times, they are the 
sole point of maritime contact within a certain region. 
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1. Billet Requirements 
The number of current FAO billets authorized does not equal billets that require 
LREC capabilities. From the data gathered, the FAO community is operating in three 
main fields: on the CNO Staff working plans, policy, and strategy (known as N5); as 
Naval/Defense Attaches who work primarily in embassies outside of the United States; 
and as SAOs that sell U.S. defense systems, defense schools, and assist with training 
exercises to build partnership capacities. A senior FAO explained that there are over 400 
billets that need to be explicitly FAO; however, there are over 1,000 billets that are FAO 
applicable. 
The quantity of URL officers is much greater than the FAO end-strength. It would 
not be practical to have a FAO on every N5 staff. Four of the nine senior officers 
interviewed, made similar comments that the number of FAOs present on these staffs 
needs to be a “significant portion.” 
I also think that significant percentages of all Navy joint and Navy staff in 
the J5/N5 that deal with international policy, security assistance, country 
desk officers, regional engagement officers, need to be FAOs . . . 
significant portions of J5/N5 billets on staffs need to be looked at for FAO 
because who is going to better advise the NAVAF commander on Gabon? 
An officer who has a graduate degree from NPS focused on Africa studies 
who speaks French and who has done an in country assignment to Ghana? 
Not Gabon, but Ghana. Or, a SWO that doesn’t speak French that was 
yanked off USS UNDERWAY and was willing to take a little bit of a risk 
to go off the beaten path? (Interviewee M) 
 Another perspective of FAO utilization is their involvement in the interagency 
coordination and planning process. The FAO training and expertise make them an ideal 
candidate in dealing with policy and government in the international community. The 
interviewee goes on to explain: 
I think FAOs should be utilized in various fellowships and the 
interagency—especially when it is dealing with our international policy 
and various think tanks to help broaden the reach of the Navy in the future 
collaborative, multifaceted approach to solving problems. Because you 
know, everywhere we go, civilians go with us. You know, it is not just a—
Afghanistan is not just a DoD issue. There is DEA in there, there is CIA in 
there, there is—Commerce is in there, I mean all these agencies. Well, 
FAO should be a significant tool, a resource for the Navy to use. 
(Interviewee M) 
 31 
2. Geographic FAO Location 
To illustrate this point, we will look at the current 2013 situation as the Navy 
pivots attention towards the Pacific. It becomes even more relevant to be engaged in 
these countries due to the increased U.S. Navy activity in that area. Historically, the 
Pacific Command (PACOM) Commander has been an Admiral. This means the area has 
been maritime centric and even more so as the United States continues to reallocate 
assets. 
Do we have any Vietnam FAOs in Vietnam? No. Do we even have a naval 
attaché there? No. It is Army. Why? So a lot of this stuff is misaligned 
especially if you take a look at the Pacific pivot. It is a great example just 
because it is there. A lot of maritime engagement in countries we just 
don’t have the presence because the billets are not there. The ships are 
going in to do the engagement, but we don’t have somebody to do the 
sustainable contacts building relationships and so on. No matter what 
people say, you know sending ships to a country over and over does not 
build relationships with the crews and people changing every single 
deployment cycle. (Interviewee N) 
 With global governments changing continuously, there are approximately 192 
countries in existence in 2013. Based on current FAO and attaché placement, however, 




Figure 4. Global Allocation of Navy FAOs (From NPC FAO Brief, 2012). 
Many officers view the FAO not only as an in-country regional specialist, but also 
as an asset that should be utilized afloat. FAOs have typically played the role of advisor 
or liaison; however, they could also be utilized throughout the conventional naval fleet. A 
Navy FAO Captain questioned why FAOs are not more utilized in the Fleet when  
he says: 
So if you do a gap analysis and say, “Where are the FAOs?” and “Why 
aren’t they on ships?” Those are all factors that you want to take a look at. 
So yes, in terms of where we want to be, we need more billets on afloat 
units, not just supporting the top-level commanders. (Interviewee N) 
F. LANGUAGE TRAINING COULD BE IMPROVED 
If there was a specific part of FAO-only training that could be improved 
upon—or it’s not FAO only training, but a critical component of FAO 
training that could be improved upon, I believe it is language training at 
DLI. (Interviewee C) 
UNCLASSIFIED 
Priorities for 21st Century Defense 
FAO Global Presence 
PACOM 
-  Australia (1)  
-  China PRC (1) 
-  China HK (1/1) 
-  Fiji (1) 
- India (2/1) 
-  Indonesia (1) 
-  Japan (1/3)  
- Malaysia (1) 
- Philippines (3) 
- Singapore (1/1/2) 
-  South Korea (3/1/8) 
-  Sri Lanka (1) 
- Taiwan (1) 
-  Thailand (2) 
CENTCOM 
- HQ Bahrain (9) 
- Egypt (2) 
-  Iraq (1)  
-  Kuwait (2) 
-  Qatar (1) 
- Saudi Arabia (2/1) 
-  UAE (1) 
EUCOM 
- HQ Stuttgart (6) 
-  Bulgaria (1/1) 
-  Denmark (1) 
-  France (1/1) 
-  Germany (1) 
- Greece (1/1) 
-  Israel (1) 
-  Italy (1/11) 
-  Netherlands (1/1) 
-  Poland (1/1)  
-  Russia (2) 
-  Spain (2) 
-  Turkey (2) 
- UK (1) 
AFRICOM 
-  HQ Stuttgart (12) 
- Angola (1) 
-  Cameroon (1) 
- Gabon (1) 
-  Libya (1) 
-  Madagascar (1/1) 
-  Mauritius (1) 
-  Morocco (1) 
-  Mozambique (1) 
-  Nigeria (1/1) 
-  Senegal (1) 
-  South Africa (1) 
-  Tunisia (1/1) 
SOUTHCOM 
-  Argentina (1) 
-  Bahamas (1) 
- Brazil (2) 
- Chile (2/1) 
-  Colombia (2) 
-  Dominican Rep (1) 
-  Ecuador (1/1) 
-  El Salvador (1) 
-  Honduras (1) 
- Panama (1/1) 
-  Peru (2/1) 
- Suriname (1) 
-  Uruguay (1) 
-  Venezuela (1) 
NORTHCOM 
- Mexico  (1/1) 
- Numbers of SCO in countries - 63 / Attachés – 30 /  OCONUS Staff – 51   





DLI is an effective training institution utilized primarily for junior enlisted 
cryptologic language training. The type of language training needed by a FAO is different 
because he or she is not an interpreter or translator. A FAO must use their language 
ability to deepen their understanding of cultural and regional awareness in order to more 
effectively advise the Fleet and warfighting commanders. 
In a standard language course of instruction—too much time was devoted 
to listening to strings of numbers because that is what cryptologists are 
doing. They are learning to listen to code break. A cryptologist does not 
need to be able to necessarily—they need to listen, they don’t need to 
necessarily be able to speak, to converse, to negotiate, to win trust. . . . 
Really the skillset of a FAO is to be able to take the newspaper, the 
morning that you wake up when you are in country with the commander, 
read through everything to see if there is anything that might affect the 
commander’s day to day operation. (Interviewee M) 
 The Navy is also missing a critical piece in the language training process. When 
compared to other services, the Navy participates the least with in-country training and 
immersion. The other services, such as the Army, will send the student FAO directly in-
country after completion of DLI. This gives the FAO a chance to perfect their language 
capability with immersion and ultimately improve their DLPT score. 
G. THE NAVY IS CONDUCTING BAD BUSINESS 
1. A Corporate Analogy 
A senior Navy FAO made an analogy between the Navy and a Fortune 500 
company. This Fortune 500 company had over 200,000 employees, and the board of 
executives was made up of specialists such as operations, finance, compliance etc. This 
was when the officer asked, “Now who in their right mind would send an operational 
specialist in charge of human resources? -The Navy will.” The officer went on to explain 
that they would need an “HR guy” in there because they are held accountable to the board 
and their shareholders. And the way the Navy has been handling manpower has created, 
as Interviewee M expressed it, “grotesquely over-manned” level at O-4 and O-5 
(regarding SWO and Aviation). 
The explanation for this was because of the winging commitment (Minimum 
Service Requirement [MSR]) for aviators and the SWO retention problem. The MSR for 
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aviators is due to the training investment the Navy has made in each aviator. The flight 
school training process is known as “winging,” takes over two years to complete and is 
very expensive. Because of this training investment, each aviator incurs a six-year 
commitment to the Navy after receiving their wings. At this point, the officer is close to 
the 10-year mark and halfway to retirement and, as a result, many officers “stay in,” 
keeping their unrestricted line designator, even after they may lose flight eligibility and 
get promoted to LCDR and CDR. 
The SWO retention problem is due to the deficiency for the Navy to retain SWOs 
past their initial commitment. This initial commitment is four to five years after 
commissioning, and automatically promotes the officer to LT. Poor retention beyond the 
initial commitment can cause a shortage at the Department Head (LCDR) level. Figure 5 
is from the Navy Personnel Command (NPC) and demonstrates how end-strength 




Figure 5. Officer Inventory Projections (NPC, 2012). 
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2. Officer Program Authorization (OPA) Explained 
The OPA is the actual number of officers authorized to be in the inventory at the 
end of the FY. This is the target for the community manager. These are billets that are 
funded and the goal is to match the OPA to end strength totals (Houser, 1996). The end 
strength total is the inventory and, as shown in Figure 4, beginning with LCDRs the OPA 
exceeds the current inventory indicating SWO is not retaining sufficient officers to 
achieve OPA. 
 Interviewee B is a retired Navy CDR and a current Navy manpower specialist. He 
explained that the Navy promotes to forecasted “vacancies.” The RL and URL 
communities each get a specific number of promotions per rank each FY, and based on 
precepts the selection boards decide who to promote. Interviewee B went on to explain 
why a SWO appears to be promoted to LCDR more than other designators, “as most 
1110 (SWO) LCDRs are either leaving, in their Department head tours or in an XO tour 
and when retention is low vacancies open up which increase promotion all  
things equal.” 
Interviewee M says that the Navy in turn has an excess amount of 1000- and 
1050-coded billets. The Manual of Navy Officer Manpower and Personnel Classification 
describes a 1000 billet code as a “Billet which may be filled by any appropriately skilled 
and experienced Unrestricted Line Officer or Special Duty Officer.” Moreover, a 1050 
billet code is an “Unrestricted Line Officer billet requiring an officer qualified in any of 
the warfare specialties (LT and above)” (NAVPERS, 2013, p. A-5). The Chief of Naval 
Personnel (CNP) assigns each community manager 1000/1050-coded billets to fill and 
these additional billets are part of the OPA and affect URL end-strength. Interviewee M 
expressed that many of these 1000/1050-coded billets are actually very FAO-specific, 
and that this process diminishes the demand signal for actual FAO (1710) billet needs. 
Although the exact number of 1000/1050 billets that are FAO specific has not 
been determined, Figure 6 is an FY 13 OPA billet comparison by rank. This is a 
comparison in the number of authorized billets coded 1000, 1050, and 1710 (FAO). 
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V. RECOMMENDATIONS, CONCLUSIONS, AND AREAS FOR 
FURTHER RESEARCH 
A. INTRODUCTION 
This thesis was designed to research the FAO community in all the armed 
services and examine both strengths and weaknesses in order to influence the Navy FAO 
program. The research was followed by interviews with senior FAOs and stakeholders 
within the community. The data gathered from senior FAO interviews gives evidence to 
where attention should be given within the community. This chapter will express 
recommendations and insights on areas of further research. 
B. RECOMMENDATIONS FROM RESEARCH AND INTERVIEWS 
The primary purpose of the senior leader interviews was to determine what 
conclusions and recommendations could be derived to make improvements in the Navy’s 
FAO program. The areas discussed in these interviews are broken down into four basic 
categories: accessions, training, utilization, and promotion. Each recommendation will 
fall under one of these categories. Training and promotion were the two topics that 
triggered the most insight; however, all four of these categories are tightly 
interconnected. 
1. Adapt New Language Training 
Current language training for the Navy FAO was described as inefficient. The 
significant structure missing was in-country language immersion. Lessons should be 
taken from the sister services’ methods of immersion and/or perhaps a joint DoD 
program where all services can take part as a supplement to DLI. Career timing was often 
the reason why immersion did not take place. As mentioned in Chapter IV, the Navy 
FAO cannot incur any more time in the training pipeline than possibly allowed, without 
negatively affecting promotion opportunity. Interviewee F is a Navy FAO CDR that 
recently completed training at DLI. He agrees with the immersion approach to language 
training when he says: 
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Immersion is the answer. We cannot truly be engaged linguistically, if we 
are in a classroom with headphones on listening to someone speak. It has 
to happen organically, in the natural environment. (Interviewee F) 
 Another reason for changing the language-training model is that FAOs are not 
learning vernacular, but rather the grammatically perfect version of that language. For 
instance, one interviewee compared the Arabic language students learn to a 
“Shakespearian version of Arabic” that is not spoken in Saudi Arabia, which was the 
region of his next assignment. This information was gathered from FAOs with  
DLI experience. 
2. Revisit the Dual Career Path Option 
If promotion is not taken into consideration, the dual career path is a viable option 
for SWO/FAO rotation. As the SWO rotates from sea to shore, they are keenly up to date 
operationally. As mentioned in the Chapter IV, many URL officers are occupying a 
fraction of the 1000/1050-coded billets that should be recoded to FAO (1710). With the 
dual career path option, a subspecialty code would allow the SWO to fill that billet in a 
“best fit” manner. This means that the SWO would have to possess skills identified to 
meet the need of that specific FAO-type billet. 
These subspecialty codes could be very easily administered and detailed to depict 
the exact area of expertise, similar to the Marine Corps (e.g., 9945: Sub-Sahara Africa). 
Community managers and detailers would more easily be able match the skill-to-need, 
rather than “gap” the billet, or fill with a volunteer. One may argue that these types of 
assignments will take the SWO out of contention for performance measures because the 
Navy has a “what have you done for me lately” mentality. This is not the case because 
these billets are often joint and staff jobs that keep the officer engaged and enhance their 
career, and are already recognized as valuable. 
3. A New Potential Model 
A majority of interviewees see the minimum years of commissioned service to be 
completely necessary for FAO credibility. Conversely, two of the subjects interviewed 
see it as a forgone opportunity for the officer to gain experience as a FAO in the junior 
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ranks. Taking the two differing views of the operational experience requirement into 
consideration, a compromised model should be considered. 
Many RL communities require at least one operational tour in order to get a 
warfare qualification known as “pinning.” After this milestone is achieved, they are 
allowed to transition into their specialty career fields (e.g., Meteorology and Engineering 
Duty [EDO]). The pinning process takes no longer than four years to attain and a 
minority of the interviewees argue that if you have the knowledge and experience to 
become warfare qualified, you have enough time to become a FAO. 
 Similar to the way an EDO (RL) must have a background in engineering, this 
model would create a compromise between the minimum YCS requirement and a 
language or master’s degree. All interviewees concur that NOB time during training 
hinders FAO career progression. This would alleviate the career-timing crunch as well as 
solve the promotion problem (see Figure 7). It also gives the junior officer the experience 
needed by way of two back-to-back LT FAO tours, or one single, longer tour. 
 
 
Figure 7. A Potential FAO Career Path Model. 
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4. Invest in FAOs in a Time of Limited Resources 
Investing in FAO expertise can influence decision makers, helping the Navy work 
smarter in a time of limited defense budget resources. Leadership should understand the 
LREC value that the FAO community gives to the Navy’s top decision makers. By better 
understanding foreign partnerships and potential threats, the Navy can make better 
decisions with asset allocation, deploying to the right parts of the world, and have a better 
global maritime understanding that will lead to an optimal operating Navy.  
5. Post-Assignment Graduate Education 
More than half of the FAO interviewees express that getting a graduate degree 
after experiencing an overseas assignment within that region gives better value to the 
program. The experts said that the primary objective in the initial FAO’s career is for the 
FAO to learn the language and complete an assignment within that region. If they then 
attend NPS in the National Security Affairs program, the FAO, at this point, will have the 
knowledge and anecdotal experience that will benefit them as well as others in the 
classroom. In addition, the FAO has a better ability to complete a more in-depth thesis 
than someone who has not been to that region, and does not have a true understanding  
of it. 
C. CONCLUSION 
The primary research question was to find what conclusions and 
recommendations on improving the FAO community could be drawn from senior FAO 
officers and stakeholders. The examination of the USA, USAF, and USMC FAO 
programs provided valuable insight on ways that the Navy could potentially strengthen its 
own program. 
The purpose of the interview process was to gather lessons learned within the past 
seven years of FAO existence. Many stakeholders had parallel conclusions that are stated 
in Chapter IV. Since the 2005 DoD directive to standup a FAO corps in all the services, 
the Navy has made significant changes in the career field. Although building to a 
community of nearly 300 officers, the Navy still falls short of the CNO directive, which 
requested a community of 400 officers. 
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It is the consensus of the FAOs interviewed that the Navy has not fully executed 
the LREC Strategy and that the FAO community has been brushed off by the mainstream 
URL, and they advocate the continuing importance of educating and exposing URL to 
value and benefit of the FAO community. It is also evident that changes should be made 
in language training and graduate education so that the FAO will not incur adverse effects 
during the promotion cycle. 
D. AREAS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
While conducting this thesis it was evident that there were a lot of questions for 
which there were no easy answers. Some of these problems have hindered the Navy in 
general for many years. The following is a list of areas recommended for further research. 
§ Adopting a new language immersion program that coordinates the FAO’s 
regional specialty and first tour assignment. Simultaneously evaluate if the 
DLI is the best training course of action for that individual. 
§ Analyze all 1000- and 1050-coded billets to determine additional FAO 
billet recoding. 
§ Evaluate the problems and solutions associated with the dual-track FAO 
program. Create a model making it feasible to progress simultaneously as 
a RL and URL. 
§ Analyze quantitatively and qualitatively the return on investment that the 
FAO brings to the Fleet. 
§ Conduct a qualitative benefit analysis of the URL officers who are 
occupying 1000/1050-coded billets. 
§ Examine the communication gap that may exist between port visits and 
Navy FAO presence, and evaluate the benefit the Navy received from 
having FAO presence within ports of call. 
§ Identify where FAOs can be utilized on afloat units and develop billets 
accordingly. 
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APPENDIX A. DODD 1315.17 APRIL 2005 
 













SUBJECT:  Military Department Foreign Area Officer (FAO) Programs   
 
References: (a) Section 163 of title 10, United States Code 
 (b) DoD Directive 1315.17, “Service Foreign Area Officer (FAO) Programs,”  
  February 22, 1997 (hereby canceled) 
 
 
1.  REISSUANCE AND PURPOSE 
 
Under reference (a), this Directive:  
 
 1.1.  Reissues reference (b) to update policies and responsibilities governing Foreign Area 
Officer (FAO) programs in the Military Departments. 
 
 1.2.  Changes proponency from the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (USD(P)), to the 
Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness (USD(P&R)). 
 
 
2.  APPLICABILITY 
 
This Directive applies to the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Military Departments, the 
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Combatant Commands, the Office of the Inspector 
General of the Department of Defense, the Defense Agencies, the DoD Field Activities, and all 
other organizational entities in the Department of Defense (hereafter referred to collectively as 
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APPENDIX B. OPNAVINST 1301.10B MAY 2006 
 
DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY  
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS  
2000 NAVY PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20350-2000  
IN REPLY REFER TO 
OPNAVINST 1301.10B 
N3/N5 
4 May 06 
OPNAV INSTRUCTION 1301.10B 
From: Chief of Naval Operations 
Subj: NAVY FOREIGN AREA OFFICER (FAO) PROGRAM 
Ref: (a) DODD 1315.17 
(b) OPNAVISNT 1300.14C 
(c) MILPERSMAN 1212-010 
(d) OPNAVINST 1210.5 
(e) OPNAVINST 7220.7E 
(f) OPNAVINST 1520.23B 
1. Purpose. Per reference (a), this instruction promulgates 
policies, procedures, and responsibilities for the management of 
the Navy Foreign Area Officer (FAO) Program. This instruction has 
been administratively revised and should be reviewed in its 
entirety. 
2. Cancellation. OPNAVINST 1301.10A. 
3 . Background 
a. To achieve national security objectives and success in 
current and future operations, including The Long War, the United 
States Navy must be prepared to conduct operations in a variety of 
geographic, economic, cultural and political circumstances, and 
across the entire range of military operations. Of particular 
importance to the naval service, whose forces are forward deployed 
to shape events unfolding overseas, is detailed regional knowledge 
of these operating environments, including the ability to 
communicate effectively with both friends and foes in the area. 
b. The goal of the Foreign Area Officer (FAO) Program is to 
produce a cadre of officers with the skills required to manage and 
analyze politico-military activities overseas. FAOs will serve as 
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APPENDIX D. REPRESENTATIVE INTERVIEW QUESTIONS 
1. Where would you recommend changes or improvements be made with training 
FAOs? 
 
2. Do you think there should be any changes to how and/or where they are utilized? 
Staffs? Afloat? COCOMs etc. 
 
3. Gains to the community are from the lateral transfer process. Do you think this is 
the best approach, or should alternatives be examined? If so, do you suppose 8 to 
12 is a fair timeline for selection? 
 
4. What are the main factors that contribute to promotion or lack thereof? 
 
5. Describe the environment you faced upon assuming your position, what 
challenges did you have? 
 
6. What is the biggest/worst manpower issue in the FAO community? 
 
7.  Where do you see the greatest cost inefficiencies? And the best ROI? 
 
8. If you were the flag sponsor for a day, what immediate changes would you make? 
 
9. Please describe your experience and the way you were selected as an FAO. 
 
10. What areas do you recommend I focus on? 
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